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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

Chippewa & Flambeau Improvement Co. v. FERC, 325 F.3d 353 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (holding the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (1)
was not barred by issue preclusion from reexamining the status of nonnavigable waters, (2) did not abuse discretion in determining that a
reservoir was necessary and appropriate for the operation of other
plants, and (3) reasonably treated four closest downstream plants as a
"complete unit" for measuring the effect of a reservoir).
Chippewa and Flambeau Improvement Company ("Chippewa")
owned a reservoir on the Flambeau River in northern Wisconsin. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") decided that
Chippewa must obtain a Federal Power Act ("FPA") license for its
Turtle-Flambeau reservoir, although the specific reservoir was not
electricity generating. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit denied Chippewa's petition for review. In
1924, FERC determined that the Flambeau River was not "navigable"
under the FPA and that the reservoir in question would not otherwise
affect interstate commerce. Although the reservoir did not generate
electricity, seasonal releases increased electric generation downstream
at other hydroelectric plants owned by Chippewa's shareholders.
FERC determined that the operation of the Turtle-Flambeau reservoir
increased the total generation at plants on the Flambeau River by five
to six percent, and that the non-electricity generating reservoir was
"necessary and appropriate" for the operation of the licensed power
plants downstream and should be subject to licensing under the FPA.
Chippewa petitioned the court for review of FERC determination.
First, the court examined Chippewa's issue preclusion argument as
to whether FERC was bound by a previous determination that the
reservoir was not subject to federal licensing requirements. The court
first determined that FERC was free to reexamine its findings in order
to take account of changes in findings and governing law. The court
also held that issue preclusion is applicable only to issues actually
litigated in a prior proceeding; FERC never considered whether the
Turtle-Flambeau reservoir should be licensed. The court determined
that the downstream river plants were changes in the river structure
sufficient to justify FERC's reassessing the Turtle Flambeau reservoir.
Next, the court assessed Chippewa's contention that FERC's
assertion ofjurisdiction did not adequately identify how the reservoir is
"necessary or appropriate" to the maintenance and operation of the
electric generating plants. The court examined the impact from the
reservoir on the electricity generating reservoir and determined that it
was reasonable for FERC to deem the reservoir "necessary or
appropriate" to the operation and maintenance of the other plantsthe emphasis upon the effect on the power generation of other plants
was consistent with the purpose of the FPA.
Finally, the court determined whether FERC arbitrarily limited its
analysis to the top four plants closest to the reservoir, thereby inflating
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the electricity-generating effect from the operation of the TurtleFlambeau reservoir. The court first deduced that the most significant
impacts of the reservoir were on the four of the eight units that FERC
used in its findings. FERC used these four plants because they are
"physically and operationally interrelated" with the Turtle-Flambeau
reservoir. Because the Clean Water Act does not define the "complete
unit" of development for FERC's finding, the court held that FERC's
deference was not unreasonable. Concluding that the FPA supported
the required license for Chippewa's non-electricity generating
reservoir, the court denied Chippewa's petition for review.
Becky Bye

Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 333 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding
Circuit Courts of Appeals lack original jurisdiction under the Clean

Water Act to review total maximum daily load decisions by the
Environmental Protection Agency).
The District of Columbia ("District") developed water quality
standards under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for the Anacostia River
addressing both dissolved oxygen and turbidity. Because the Anacostia
violated these water quality standards, the District developed Total
Maximum Daily Loads ("TMDLs") for the river pursuant to the CWA,
which limited the maximum pollution input allowed into the water
body. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") approved the
District's TMDL for dissolved oxygen in December 2001 and approved
the TMDL for turbidity in March 2002. Following these decisions,
Friends of the Earth ("FOE") filed suit in the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming the standards were insufficient to
protect water quality. The EPA moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that
the court of appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review
TMDLs because they are governed by section 1313 of the CWA.
Section 1369(b)(1) does not expressly authorize courts of appeal
to review TMDL determinations under section 1313. As a result, the
EPA argued that the court could not review the decision, while FOE
argued that approval of TMDLs fell within section 1369(b) (1) (E) of
the CWA.
The court of appeals ultimately held it lacked original jurisdiction
to review EPA approvals of TMDLs, dismissed the petition for review,
and transferred the case to the district court for consideration of
whether the action could be reviewed under the Administrative
Procedure Act. In reaching its holding, the court of appeals looked at
the plain language of the statute and held that 1369(b) (1) of the CWA
governed the limited original jurisdiction of federal courts of appeal
reviewing EPA actions.
The court noted the statute explicitly
authorized a court of appeal to review the approval of effluent
limitations under sections 1311, 1312, 1316 or 1345 of the CWA, but
was silent regarding the ability of a court of appeals to review approval

